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TRANSNATIONAL CRITICAL RACE SCHOLARSHIP:
TRANSCENDING ETHNIC AND NATIONAL
CHAUVINISM IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
IbrahimJ. Gassama*
Globalization is compounding the gap between rich and poor nations and
intensifying U.S. Dominance of the world's economic and cultural market.'
[M]ore than 1.3 billion people in the developing world still
struggle to survive on less than a dollar a day, and the num-
ber continues to increase. Every year nearly 8 million
children die from diseases linked to dirty water and air pol-
lution, 50 million children are mentally or physically
damaged because of inadequate nutrition, and 130 million
children-80 percent of them girls-are denied the chance
to go to school
Eric Yamamoto's article, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political
Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, brings a needed perspective to
scholarship seeking to place domestic social justice struggles within the
context of a broader and more complex mix of forces at play. While
Yamamoto does not highlight a critical transnational perspective in this
particular article, 4 he writes from a perspective that presumes transnational
analysis is essential in making sense of the socio-economic and political
* Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law; J.D. Harvard Law
School; B.A. Virginia Tech. Once again I am grateful for the unflagging encouragement
and editorial help of my colleague Keith Aoki. I would also like to thank Maggie Chon
and Eric Yamamoto for giving me this opportunity to comment on Eric's contributions.
Cory Smith and Toby Bonini provided invaluable research help.
1. See generally UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT 1999. For a brief "mainstream" treatment of the growing domestic wealth
gap, see Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wealth Gap Grows: Why Does it Matter?, WALL ST. J., Sept.
13, 1999, at Al (explaining why, despite overall economic growth, the increase in
difference in wealth between the richest and poorest Americans is still a problem).
2. THE WORLD BANK, POVERTY REDUCTION AND THE WORLD BANK, vii (1996).
3. Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice
in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Critical
Race Praxis].
4. For a more directly transnational approach by Yamamoto, see Eric K. Yamamoto,
Race Apologies, I J. GENDER, RACE &JUST. 47 (1997) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Race Apologies]
(examining the reparatory efforts of South Africa's post-apartheid Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission in an effort to evaluate the potential of a recent wave of apologies
around the world to aid domestic redress of racial injustice); see also Erik K. Yamomoto,
Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV.
477 (1999) [hereinafter Yamomoto, Racial Reparations] (examining the connections
between Japanese American and other redress movements).
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forces affecting our lives as individuals and members of multiple, inter-
secting communities. The local, the national, and the international are
inextricably bound and present in all his work.' This article, as well as his
larger body of works, helps puncture the self-satisfied attitude of Ameri-
can national exceptionalism, or superiority, that now so crudely bestrides
the world.6
In Critical Race Praxis, Yamamoto employs two ongoing litigations
in the San Francisco area to develop his argument for the cultural and
professional stance he terms critical race praxis. In the first case, Ho v. San
Francisco Unified School District,' Chinese American plaintiffs sued to
overturn "a 1983 judicial consent decree desegregating San Francisco's
schools."8 The decree aimed to promote ethnic diversity in these schools
by, among other things, placing a cap on the number of students from
any racial or ethnic group admitted into a magnet school.9 While Chinese
Americans had benefited initially from this judicial resolution, over time
some in the community began to see the cap as an unfair ceiling on their
numbers. ' Citing relatively higher entrance test scores, plaintiffs argued
that implementation of the decree resulted in discrimination against
Chinese American students in favor of "less qualified" students from the
Latino and African American communities." Plaintiffs sought an end to
racial classification and quotas, calling for a colorblind system that recog-
nized individual merit)2 Pitted against the plaintiffs were the NAACP and
others from the traditional civil rights establishment.
13
In the second case, United Minorities Against Discrimination v. San
Francisco,'4 African American and Latino plaintiffs charged that the local
5. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. PEv.
741, 741 (1994); KEITH AOKI, SPACE INVADER s: THE CONVERGENCE OF RACE, SPACE AND
PLACE IN THE 1990s (Apr. 30, 1998 draft on file with author) [hereinafter AOKI, SPACE
INVADERS]; L. Hope Lewis, Lionheart Girls Facing the Dragon: the Human Rights of In-
ter/national Black Women in the United States, 76 OR. L. Rv. 567 (1997) [hereinafter
Lewis, Lionheart Girls]; Elizabeth Iglesias, Human Rights in International Economtic Law, 28
INTER-AMERICAN L. REv. 361 (1996-97) [hereinafter Iglesias, Human Rights].
6. This salutary contribution also comes across in Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra
note 4; Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 4, at 477.
7. 965 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1997), appeal dismissed, 641 F.3d 854 (9th Cir.
1998).
8. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 821.
9. See Ho, 965 F. Supp. at 1318-19.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 1319.
12. See id.
13. See id. (noting that the consent decree at issue was entered into between the San
Francisco Unified School District and the San Francisco NAACP).
14. Third Amended Complaint for Monetary, Declaratory, & Injunctive Relief,
United Minorities Against Discrimination v. City of San Francisco, No. C-91-2350
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government discriminated against African American and Latino personnel
analysts when making hiring and promotion decisions. 's The complaint
indicated that most of the alleged perpetrators and beneficiaries of the
discriminatory practices were "less-qualified" Asian Americans.'
6
Reviewing the specific and broader arguments made by the parties
and their supporters in these lawsuits, I have to caution myself against an
impulse to dismiss much of the intricate, and seemingly interminable
battles for political and economic advantages between and across ethnic,
racial, and social groups in the United States. I am often filled with an
overriding sense that most of these "domestic," intergroup conflicts
revolve around each group's desire to take its perceived "rightful" place
inside a bloated and acquisitive American'7 machine that so aggressively
polices the world economically, culturally, politically, and militarily. Put
another way, many of those engaged in these internal squabbles send
signals that often appear to be coded pleas to be better integrated within
the American vision of a New World Order-the neo-imperial efforts to
rationalize and sustain America's insatiable grab for greater and greater
proportions of the world's resources. '
Today, as we are reminded time and again, the United States is the
world's sole remaining superpower with a superheated economy that is
the envy of the rest of the world. Yet, with less than five percent of the
world's population, the United States unapologetically consumes far more
than a proportionate share of the world's resources. '9 The American
(N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 9, 1994), cited in Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at
837.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. I consciously use the terms "America" and "American" in this article to refer to
the United States and to its citizens, residents and representatives. I recognize that this is
sometimes offensive to other inhabitants of the Americas and admire the irony of suc-
cumbing to this usage given my criticism of the new imperial global order being
propagated from the United States. See David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law
and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 9, 10 & n. 1 (1999) (adopting the adjective "United
Statesean" from Spanish to "avoid imprecision and offense").
18. At the heart of the program, of course, is the full scale press for open markets
under the rubric of the new World Trade Organization (WTO). This grand structure has
given energy and focus to the older General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Together with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the WTO-GATT
regime today polices global inequality. See David C. Korten, The Failures of Bretton Woods,
in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 28-30 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith
eds., 1996).
19. See LESTER R. BROWN, ET AL, STATE Of: THE WORLD 12 (1998). According to the
United Nations, "more than three-fourths of the world's people live in developing
countries, but they enjoy only 16% of the world's income-while the richest 20% have
85% of global income." UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 1995 HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 14 (1995); see also Ignacio Ramonet, The Politics of Hunger, LE
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economy, largely dependent on an apparently irrepressible demand for
cheaply made foreign consumer goods, propels along as the twentieth
century comes to an end even as most of the rest of the world-Europe,
Japan, China, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America--struggles to stay
afloat.2 American economic supremacy is not new and neither are some
of the governmental policies and practices that proceed along with it:
pitifully small amounts of economic assistance to the world's poor, an
unbridled military-industial complex that leads the world in the export
of arms, and a propensity to employ military force against foreigners
22
who challenge its dominance.
There are, of course, domestic parallels to all these examples of fun-
damental injustices and these, perhaps understandably, dominate the
thinking of most American activists and scholars engaged in anti-
subordination work. Nonetheless, it appears from my particular vantage
point23 that significant within every oppressed community in the United
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Barry Smerin trans. 1998) <http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/en/1998/11/01leader.htm> (noting that in 1995, the income of the
20% of the world's population living in the richest countries was 82 times greater than
that of the 20% of the poorest countries).
20. See William Greider, The Global Crisis Deepens: Now Wat?, THE NATION, Oct.
19, 1998, at 13-15; Judith Miller, Globalization Widens Rich-Poor Gap, U.N. Report Says,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at A8.
21. The United States is also the largest deadbeat member of the UN. Indeed its
failure to pay all of its dues has caused serious problems in all facets of UN operation. See
David Stout, A Deal is Reached on Family Planning Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at
A21; Eric Schmitt, U.S. Decides to Pay Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at A2.
22. In a sense, the century is ending much as it began in terms of American use of
force against foreign enemies. It began with American military forces spreading out to
create a Pax Americana around the world including Cuba, the Philippines, Hawaii, and
China, and it is ending with growing military commitments in the Middle East and the
Balkans. See HAROLD EVANS, THE AMERICAN CENTURY 48-80 (1998) (containing
snapshots of burgeoning American imperialism in the early part of the century). Note that
even as the United States officially speaks ad nauseaum about the need for the rule of law
in international relations, its military attacks on other nations rarely follow core interna-
tional rules such as gaining the approval of the United Nations Security Council. In this
vein, mention must be made also that after calling for a permanent international criminal
court, the United States now remains the main barrier to the creation of one because such
a court conceivably could assert jurisdiction over American officials. The opposition can
be characterized as fundamentally founded upon the arrogance inhering in the belief that
American officials and representatives should be above collective judgment in the
international arena even though others, especially from the third world, should submit.
23. Some disclosure about my background is in order. While I have lived in the
United States for far longer than anywhere else, I was not born here. I was born in Sierra
Leone, a small country by most standards, where a focus on the international and global
was not an option; it was a necessity. See Norimitsu Onishi, Sierra Leone Victims and Rebels
Hear Albright's Message of Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1999, at Al; James Rupert, Riches
Complicate African Conflict, REG. GUARD, Oct. 17, 1999, at 18A.
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States is a perspective that could be summarized as follows: if the
United States is going to be the world's principal enforcer of a global
regime of inequality, our members should at least get equal opportunity
to participate in this imperial enterprise whether it is to command
military forces in Iraq or Korea; to run C.I.A. stations in Paris or Kuala
Lumpur; to negotiate drilling rights in Ogoniland or Baku; to deny visas
to "economic immigrants" in Bangkok or Freetown; or to win scholar-
ships endowed by some dead imperialists. This is what I observe as the
many "firsts" that are celebrated and we dutifully keep count of the
numbers of representatives of this or that excluded community recruited
into higher levels in the machinery of global supremacy. The fights over
which disadvantaged groups get seats at the imperial dinner table, or get
to taste some of the dribblings from it, usually occur without much heed
paid to the broader transnational picture.
The relative absence of a transnational or global perspective in the
unfolding of many of these "domestic" struggles for justice is the focus of
my comment on Eric Yamamoto's work. This absence is rarely chal-
lenged. Indeed, the attitude of neglect is so pervasive, it often operates
unacknowledged.24 It is testimony to the enormous strength of the myth
of American national exceptionalism that even those acutely and histori-
cally oppressed by its operation adopt its precepts uncritically, and actually
nurture it in their struggles. At its core are the twin notions of funda-
mental faith, both in the integrity and sufficiency of the "American"
nation and in the mythology of social progress. Great care is taken among
mainstream activists not to destabilize the nation, or appear to do so, even
at the expense of social justice.
There is a part of me that understands, accepts, and sometimes even
supports the highly contextualized desires and demands energizing these
intra-American "domestic" struggles.5 I have lived in the United States
too long not to appreciate what drives them. I have lived in other places
and studied other societies enough to know that excluded groups every-
where behave in much the same way: seeking to survive or prosper as
24. See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) (providing a comprehensive examination of the African American
struggle for racial justice); Robert S. Chang, The End of Innocence or Politics after the Fall of
the Essential Subject, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 687 (1996) (exploring how to account for
differences while at the same time allowing participation in others' struggles through the
use of coalition building).
25. The argument here is similar to the one justifying the use of "rights" language by
members of oppressed communities. As one writer puts it in the South African context,
"we must accept the imagery and language and symbolism that is most appropriate to the
occasion." Albie Sachs in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 13
(1995); see also Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
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best as possible, making tactical alliances, sometimes even defending
26
aspects of the overarching system. An example can be found in a recent
international human rights law class, where a Korean student, who could
be described as progressive and by no means a friend of corporate domi-
nance, presented a powerful denunciation of the scavenger-like moves of
American financial institutions into the devastated Korean economy.
7
These moves were facilitated by the eager bureaucrats of the International
Monetary Fund and excess cash from a booming American stock market.
The American companies were chasing opportunities to acquire major
Korean companies for pennies on the dollar.28 Heretofore, Korea had
managed to successfully limit foreign control of key sectors of the Korean
economy and developed homegrown conglomerates that competed
resolutely in the international arena. Now, with the presumed death of
Asian "Crony" capitalism, and the "triumph" of the supposedly resilient,
individualistic American version, nothing short of prostration or open
markets is expected from countries that want IMF (read American-
sanctioned) aid .2
9
The student was quite distressed at the profound threat to Korea's
"economic sovereignty." However, I found it difficult to be moved by
the likely demise of several Korean multinational conglomerates. I won-
dered whether Samsung or Hyundai or any of the other once high-flying
Jaebols,35 with their export platforms all over the world, really should
26. For example, in recent visits to South Africa, I have detected a developing
impatience, perhaps even distaste, for outsiders, especially Americans among newly
enfranchised South Africans. Recalling that it was not long ago that many South Africans
pleaded passionately for outside support for their struggle against apartheid, I am distressed
but not entirely surprised by the new-found disdain for outside intervention and uncriti-
cal embrace of traditional notions of national sovereignty.
27. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, Korea To Sell Control of Bank to U.S. Investors, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1999, at Cl; Stephanie Strom, U.S. Firm has Control of Korea's First Bank,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at C2.
28. See Republic of Korea, IMF Stand-By Arrangement: Summary of the Economic
Program, (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/oth/korea.htm>
(requiring, among other things, that "the schedule for allowing foreign entry into the
domestic financial sector will be accelerated . . . " and that steps be taken to "liberalize
foreign investment in the Korean equity market by increasing the ceiling on aggregate
ownership from 26 percent to . . . 55 percent by end-1998"). For additional examples of
such moves by U.S.-based companies into the broader Asian economy, see Jathon
Sapsford, Citibank Sets an Ambitious Credit Line in Japan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1998, at
A10.
29. See William Pfaff, Globalization Drive is Getting Dangerous, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan.
26, 1998, at 11A. (stating that the United States as the largest shareholder in the IMF,
which employs a weighted voting system, can easily exercise a veto over the organiza-
tion's "aid" programs).
30. Jaebols or Chaebols are Korean integrated industrial groups, conglomerates of many
companies clustered around one holding company. Examples include Hyundai and
[VOL. 5:133
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mean more; that is, command greater fidelity among Koreans than say
Citicorp, WorldCom-MCI, Daimler-Chrysler, or Toyota.31 Of course
over the years, I have grown weary of asking the same questions of
American students who were concerned about the survival of Harley-
Davidson or the American electronic, footwear, or automobile indus-
tries.
32
So what? Americans, Koreans, and everyone else tend to see the
world from their own highly particularized standpoints. There is nothing
new about that. Defending the "national interest" is a crowd pleaser
anywhere in the world. Still, domestic inter-group conflicts in the United
States often seem especially hyper-chauvinistic to me, even as I acknowl-
edge the contextual validity of particular claims. These debates and
struggles occur within boundaries that are largely impervious to transna-
tional implications or solidarity, although on occasion, some of these
struggles pause to incorporate critical global dimensions or realities.33 Such
instances are, however, quite rare, narrowly confined, and generally for
instrumental purposes.
In this so-called post-Cold War era3 4 when perhaps the most funda-
mental of all human rights--self-determination-can no longer be limited
to discrete privileged groups or confined within any national boundary
3
1
Daewoo. Until recently, the top four chaebols account for 40-45 percent of South Korea's
gross national product. See Samuel Len, Korean Congolmerates Remain Entrenched, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999, at C8.
31. Does anyone care anymore whether Daimler-Chrysler, for example, is an
"American" or "German" company? Who owns Firestone or Dr. Pepper or the Pillsbury
Doughboy? Most American machine tool companies have been "foreign" owned for
years. See Joseph B. White, Global Mall: There are no German or U.S. Companies Only
Successful Ones, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1998, at Al.
32. In keeping with this transnational trend, the U.S. Department of Defense
recently has embarked on a policy of encouraging American defense companies to sell
some of their more sophisticated weaponry to "foreigners." See R. Jeffrey Smith, Arms
Trade Menaces U.S. Security, Panel Says, WASH. POST, June 24, 1996, at A9; Laurie
Goering, U.S. Role as S. America's Arms Supplier Debated, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1998, at 3;
Frank 0. Mora & Antonio L. Pala, U.S. Arms Transfer Policy for Latin America, AIRPOWER
J., Apr. 1, 1999, at 76.
33. See e.g., Tina Kelley, Whaling Standoff in Neah Bay, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 12, 1998, at 3 (describing the controversy between the Makah tribe and anti-
whaling activists over the tribe's decision to re-engage in the traditional hunt of Gray
whales).
34. It should be observed that the choice of the term "Cold War" is unlikely to
resonate positively with many people in the Third World. In Afghanistan, Angola,
Cambodia, Cuba, Chile, Guatemala, Mozambique, South Africa, and Vietnam-to name
just a few places-the deadly East-West rivalry during this period was anything but cold.
See ERIc HOBSBAWN, THE AGE oF EXTREMES 245-56 (1996).
35. From Canada, where French-speaking Quebecois are demanding independence,
to Chechnya, Kosovo to Scotland and Wales, the demands for greater autonomy and
human rights grow. These demands are of course illustrative in many cases of the same
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and where communities everywhere are struggling to respond to enor-
mous global economic and socio-cultural forces, such a persistently
myopic vision illuminates hubris or madness. Tragedy is inevitable. Think
about a recent example: when American embassies were bombed in
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, scores of people-some Americans but
mostly "others"-died.36 The United States then responded by bombing
Afghanistan and the Sudan, killing more faceless "others."
There is more. Hundreds of American FBI agents and military per-
sonnel descended on Kenya and Tanzania to investigate. Captured
suspects were flown unceremoniously to the United States for trial. The
main suspect, we are told, is a Saudi national, Osama bin Laden, formerly
• 7
based in Sudan but now living in Afghanistan. Aside from this, about all
we know of him is that he is wealthy and hates the United States, even
though in the past he received support from the United States via Paki-
stan and Saudi Arabia to wage war on the former Soviet Union. 38 As
complex and confusing as this picture is, one searches the traditional news
sources for signs of a fuller, more textured appreciation of the transna-
tional perspective but finds only the same narrow American-interest
concerns, even from liberals who distinguish themselves today mainly by
their muted expressions of regret as they acquiesce in whatever official
actions do not threaten their material possessions. Where is the global
community? The question must be asked not only of the establishment
types, but also of those engaged in anti-subordination struggles in the
United States. Where does the idea of global community fit into the
intra-American struggles for rights and opportunities?
39
Kenyans, Tanzanians, Sudanese, Saudis, Afghanis, and others do not
exist merely to satisfy or die for American interests. They too have their
perspectives, their hopes and visions. Furthermore, their everyday lives,
their triumphs and failures as they confront their justice issues, whether
persistent chauvinistic tendency criticized here-the failure of the human spirit in a
community to reach out with bonds of understanding and solidarity to others with similar
hopes and desires struggling against the same. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP 187-91 (1995).
36. More than two hundred and fifty people, including 12 American citizens, were
killed in the August 7 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. See FBI: 2 Vehicles Used to Bomb
U.S. Embassy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 17, 1998, at 14a; David Johnston, Bombing
Suspect Found in Pakistan, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 18, 1998, at Al.
37. See Johnston, supra note 36, at Al; Amos Perlmutter, Haphazard War on Terrorism,
WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 1998, at A19.
38. See Perlmutter, supra note 37, at A19.
39. For an example of the type of transnational perspective that I am advocating in
this article, see RANDALL ROBINSON, DEFENDING THE SPIRIT (1998).
[VOL. 5:133
Transnational Critical Race Scholarship
similar or different from Americans', could help Americans as they strug-
gle with their own justice issues.-
Yamamoto's orientation is especially attractive because it pushes the
slow and difficult process of purging American progressive politics of the
crude and virulent strain of ethnocentric chauvinism. 4 ' This strain has
.generally been associated with right-wing politics but has crept into racial
justice struggles-a consequence perhaps of failed aspirations of erstwhile
leaders of the dispossessed to buy their way into national acceptance. By
opening wider the door of transnational analysis, Yamamoto's articles
help shift progressive race scholarship away from racial or national excep-
tionalism toward a more meaningful, less myopic appreciation of global
interconnectedness and the necessity for a scholarship and politics of
solidarity.42
In the rest of this essay, I focus on two themes developed by
Yamamoto in his analysis of the forces and circumstances surrounding the
two litigations 3 that provide the platform for his argument: (1) an inten-
sifying dissociation of law (as it conceives ofjustice) from racial justice (as
experienced by racialized groups); and (2) a disjuncture between progres-
sive race theory and frontline political lawyering practice. Critical race
praxis, according to Yamamoto, provides the appropriate response to the
problems of dissociation and disjuncture. As he conceives it, "[C]ritical
race praxis combines critical, pragmatic, socio-legal analysis with political
lawyering and community organizing to practice justice by and for
racialized communities. Its central idea is that racial justice requires
antisubordination practice.", 44 My comment locates these themes, and the
insights emanating from them, within a newer, more vibrant direction in
critical race scholarship that recognizes how United States' domestic and
international policies promote and police the globalization or
40. See generally Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 4 (listing examples of injustices
towards various groups and individuals deserving of apologies).
41. For example, in another work, Yamamoto describes how the case for Japanese-
American reparations for internment during World War I was sold to the American
public and Congress by advocates who stressed the "superpatriotism" of Japanese Ameri-
cans "who are loyal to and willing to sacrifice for the United States." Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations, supra note 4, at 500.
42. See, e.g., ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST
STRATEGY: TOWARD A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 176 (1985) (analyzing the
development of "new social movements" as contributing to diffusion of social conflicts
and the emergence of new social relations).
43. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 827-30.
44. Id. at 829.
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transnationalization of everyday life." This newer direction understands
that those who seek justice within the domestic sphere of American life
cannot afford to divorce their struggles from the much larger global
endeavor.46
A. An Intensifying Dissociation: Transnational Implications
In analyzing the Ho and United Minorities cases, Yamamoto identifies a
phenomenon that he describes as an "intensifying dissociation of law (as it
conceives of racial justice) from racial justice (as it is experienced by racial-
ized groups). 47 He sees this dissociation as one aspect of a general national
"retreat from racial Justice. 4 4 His analysis highlights three dimensions of this
dissociation: (1) how law in general has helped to maintain historic racial
oppression;49 (2) how anti-discrimination laws have largely failed and,
indeed in significant ways, betrayed racial mnorities; 0 and (3) how limited
the utility of the dominant bipolar Black-White jurisprudential paradigm is
in dealing with complex conflicts among communities of color.5 ' The
parallels and interrelationships between his immediate analytical terrain and
the global perspective leap from the pages.
While Yamamoto's broad message about the limited efficacy of "the
Rule of Law" vision of the American establishment in dealing with racial
oppression is much remarked upon and generally well understood, 2 his
45. See Harris, supra note 5, at 741 (signifying the new direction that critical race
scholarship has taken); AoKI, SPACE INVADERS, supra note 5 (Apr. 30, 1998 draft on file
with author) (surveying how legal scholars incorporate political geography in their
examination of the interaction between race and law); Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant
in the Inter/National Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1395 (1997); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual)
Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1293 (1996); Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Action, the Family, and the
Dream that is America, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1115 (1996); Robert S. Chang, The End
of Innocence or Politics After the Fall of the Essential Subject, 45 Am. U. L. REV. 687 (1996);
Robert S. Chang, Foreword: Towards A Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV.
139 (1997); Iglesias, Human Rights, supra note 5, at 361; Hope Lewis, Women
(Under)Development: The Relevance of "The Right to Development" to Poor Women of Color in
the United States, 18 LAW & PoL'Y 281 (1996); Hope Lewis, Lionheart Girls, supra note 5.
46. See, e.g., Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 4, at 47 (describing recent efforts
around the world to tackle historic wrongs against minorities or subjugated communities).
47. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 828.
48. Id. at 828 (citing STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING BLACK: THE RETREAT FROM
RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA THOUGHT AND POLICY 213 (1995)).
49. See id. at 828, 840-44.
50. See id. at 828, 844-52.
51. See id. at 840, 852-66.
52. See e.g., BELL, supra note 24 (1987) (providing a critical examination of the
African American struggle for racial justice); Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights, and the Quest
for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Essay, 23 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1998)
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analysis buttresses a key indictment of how law-as-practiced confers
inferior status on many while limiting opportunities for comprehensive
social transformation. 3 More importantly, however, Yamamoto's analysis
weaves together the gnarled threads of socio-economic and cultural
derogation that bind oppressed communities all over the world. 4 His
examples range from the coldly rational and brutal state law-sanctioned
slave system 5 and the infamous and pragmatic "three-fifths" treatment of
blacks in the United States Constitution5 6 to the transcontinental "ethnic
cleansing" of Native Americans, 7 the denial of naturalization opportuni-
ties to nonwhites, 8 the brutal and cynical annexation of Hawaii, 9 the
Chinese Exclusion Acts,60 and the internment .6,Chinse x l ionAct,  rne of Japanese-Americans.
With these varied examples Yamamoto exposes not only the dark past of
the present order that many would prefer to forget but also historic,
transgenerational and transnational chains of oppression upon which
worldwide solidarity could be forged. Can the analysis be complete
without noting, for example, the United States' support for apartheid
South Africa during the Cold War years or the forty plus years of eco-
nomic warfare that the United States has waged upon Cuba?
62
(addressing Critical Legal Studies in addition to exploring whether there exists a standard
Critical Legal Studies critique of rights).
53. For example, he quotes Rennard Strickland as follows: "I am talking not about
... cold blooded atrocities but about law and the ways in which [cultural] genocidal
objectives have been carried out under color of law .... These were legally enacted
policies whereby a way of life, a culture, was deliberately obliterated." Yamamoto, Critical
Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 843 (quoting Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: an Historic
and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REV. 713, 719
(1986)).
54. See generally LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 42.
55. See KENNETH M. STAMP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1972) (discussing pre-Civil
War southern slavery and the effect of its social remains upon American society).
56. See MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860 (1981).
57. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
58. See SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY (1991)
(discussing the common refugee and immigrant experiences among Asian Americans).
59. See HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND
SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAII (1999).
60. See ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSIBLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-
CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 177-78 (1971) (discussing the enactment of the
Chinese Exclusion Act); RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 111-12
(1989) (discussing the socio-economic and legislative background of the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act).
61. See JACOBUS TEN BROECK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1954) (discussing the social, political, theoretical and legal aspects of the Japanese
American internment camps).
62. For a critical perspective on the United States role in maintaining apartheid see
Ibrahim J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: The United
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It should be expected, given the intensity, duration, and pervasive-
ness of legally-sanctioned racial oppression, that communities of color
within the United States would not find it difficult to be skeptical of the
assumed superiority of a law-centered approach to ending racial oppres-
sion. As Yamamoto reminds us, however, the law-centered, traditional,
"integrationist," civil rights approach has dominated racial justice efforts
for several decades. This approach is built on the favored mythical image
of the United States as a "country of laws, not men"-where the legal
system, hence its core social structure, is fundamentally sound, albeit
occasionally subject to unrepresentative acts of some bad people trying to
pervert the process. 63 Nowhere does one hear this mantra more often
than when the issue is the way in which racialized minorities fare in the
criminal justice system." Reform efforts within this national mirage are
thus aimed at eliminating minor "pockets" of deviance-the few "bad
cops," etc. Essentially, everything in the United States is more or less all
right and the legal system is more than up to the task of "fixing" the
problem when "isolated" incidents of injustice occur.
One sees this attitude reflected also in the traditional law school cur-
riculum where "human rights" is relegated to the study of the unjust
things that happen to other people in other countries; within the United
States, the orthodox concern is about a subset of constitutional law
denoted "civil rights." The other, or "international," human rights
syllabus is usually quite broad, a rather "soft" quasi-legal collection of
politics, economics, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, etc. The
subject is fundamentally aspirational; these other people still have a long
way to go in developing their legal system or culture. Civil rights study,
on the other hand, is very much located in the sphere of hard law-
indeed closeted within the hardest of hard law: Constitutional Law.
Politics, economics, and the like are only tangentially at play since "we"
basically have a national consensus that "we" are basically all right and
certainly doing better than these other countries or people with undevel-
oped legal cultures. What liberal has not sought to wrap up a discussion
on problems in the United States by pointing to the "progress" that "we"
Nations, NGOs, and Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1464 [hereinafter Gassama,
Reaffirming Faith](discussing the embargo on Cuba); IBRAHIM J. GASSAMA, FORTY YEARS
OF HOSTILITY: INHUMANE CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S. ECONOMIC EMBARGO ON CUBA
(Report of the TransAfrica forum Cuba Delegation, Mar. 1999); Shari-Ellen Bourque,
The Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Current International System, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J.
191 (1995).
63. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 845-51.
64. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA R-IGHTS FOR ALL
(1998) for a recent comprehensive report on human rights violations in the United States.
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have made, the long way that "we" have come?6 The limits, pitfalls, and
social costs of "this sharply constricted" and compartmentalized approach
to the concerns of the dispossessed in the United States are now much
better and more broadly appreciated because of the work of scholars like
Yamamoto.66
Yamamoto's analysis reveals yet again the tragedy of the "liberal im-
pulse to escape politics" through law.67 American liberalism's faith in an
orderly, progressive dismantling of historic structures of oppression
through litigation and legislative enactments has repeatedly come face to
face with the hostility of an unrelenting, neo-conservative judiciary, as
well as other political forces which feel threatened by the rather marginal
steps toward racial justice taken in the brief flowering of the early civil
rights era. Agents of the traditional civil rights paradigm, having failed to
demand accountability for past injustices from perpetrators and benefici-
aries found their token demands easily rebuffed. In this respect, they were
easily seduced by token acceptance into apparently inner rings of power
as well as by their own rhetoric of the inevitability of progress.
Richard Nixon unveiled the take-back program with his "Southern
Strategy" during his presidential campaign in the late Sixties. 8 Ronald
Reagan and George Bush made it the norm as they populated the
judiciary with righteously indignant reactionaries, often politely referred to
65. Even sophisticated observers cannot seem to help resorting to this syrupy type of
analysis. For example, Douglass Brinkley accounts that "the United States' embrace of its
melting pot-or what Martin Luther King, Jr., called 'a single garment of destiny'-has
produced a country and a people such as the world has never seen." DOUGLAS BRINKLEY,
AMERICAN HERITAGE: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 609 (1998). This was written
about a period when a largely disproportionate number of Black men were incarcerated,
large numbers of Haitian "boat people" were forcibly returned to the control of a
tyrannical regime and asylum seekers were being discouraged with harsh treatment. See
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 64, at 87-98.
66. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 846-52; see also Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 518 (1980) (suggesting the interests of blacks in quality education does not necessar-
ily coincide with any interest in integration); Mark Tushnet, What Really Happened in
Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991) (describing limitations
and failures of Brown v. Board of Education and subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence in
desegregating schools).
67. The phrase is borrowed from Martii Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law,
1 EUR. J. INT. L. 4, 6 (1990); see also id. at 7 (arguing that "our inherited ideal of a World
Order based on the Rule of Law thinly hides from sight the fact that social conflict must
still be solved by political means .... ").
68. See NICHOLAS LEHMANN, THE PROMISED LAND 203 (1991) (pointing out that
Nixon's decreasing delegate strength in the south during the 1968 election led him to
implement a "Southern Strategy" aimed at reassuring white southerners that they would
not experience radical racial change); C. VAN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW 211-14 (3rd rev. ed. 1974).
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as neo-conservatives. 69 Bush's appointment of Clarence Thomas to the U.S.
Supreme Court symbolized not just the triumph of "neo-conservatives,"
but the contempt that they nurtured for the traditional civil rights vision. 7
To a significant degree, the liberal vision, whatever its other lasting contri-
butions, helped to soften up racialized groups for reactionary
counterattacks.
Keith Aoki has pointed out a fundamental flaw in the traditional
civil rights paradigm: its mistaken analysis of racism as essentially the
manifestation of irrational desires of the mind.7 ' As such, racism is aberra-
tional, merely the product of unenlightened thinking. Ameliorative
measures to cure this deviancy thus focused on integration and exaggerated
the benefits that would flow from racial and ethnic mixing. These efforts
failed to address to any substantial degree the core problem of concrete
maldistribution of power and the unequal social system that it creates and
nurtures.7 2 Indeed, the narrowly-targeted program of the traditional civil
rights movement was explicitly conditioned, like the granting of reparations
to Japanese Americans, for example, upon allegiance to the core social
structure including both its domestic power differential and the external
imperial enterprise. Those recently noticed, acknowledged, or emanci-
pated, like conquered armies of old, often saw few options other than
rallying, at least publicly, to the defense of the triumphant order. The
struggles, as interpreted or reinterpreted over time, were not for any
69. See Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
70. See generally JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF
CLARENCE THOMAS (1996) (recounting the "selling" of Clarence Thomas to Americans
through the use of distortions and falsehoods).
71. See AOKI, SPACE INVADERS, supra note 5; see also Stokely Carmichael, Power and
Racism, in CRISIS: A CONTEMPORARY READER 58 (1969) (arguing that the civil rights
movement's tone was adapted to fit a white, liberal audience).
72. Writer and human rights activist, Randall Robinson, describes the situation in
more eloquent language:
African-Americans, perhaps still placated by the fool's gold of integration
as an endgame achievement, seem not to have noticed our worsening
condition with any alarm. At some point beyond the peak of the civil
rights movement, we lost our bearings, as if sleepwalking. When we
thought about it at all, we reckoned that we were forward of where we
had been before. But if we had progressed, it hadn't been by much. Our
longitude had changed but our latitude was virtually the same. If the new
social terrain looked unfamiliar, it was only because we had drifted side-
ways, if not backward as well.
ROBINSON, supra note 39, at xiv; see also BELL, supra note 24 (providing a comprehensive
examination of the African American struggle for racial justice).
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wide-ranging set of fundamental human rights, but for civil rights73-a
manifestation and triumph of the old order of American national excep-
tionalism. Belying Gil Scott Heron's predictions, the civil rights
"revolution" gradually became a televised spectacle; indeed, it became
part of regular programming, rated G, systematized, and compromised.
When neo-conservatives began quoting the late Reverend Martin Luther
King, Jr. to rebut the traditional civil rights establishment, it was time to
switch channels.
74
Law, as Yamamoto points out, was a critical instrument in this proc-
75
ess of co-optation or domestication. Its alienated and alienating structure
and procedures provided an opiate for civil rights escapists. 76 In reality, a
few more drummers were added to the band as it played on, missing nary
a beat.
Yamamoto's dissociation theme readily accommodates a transnational
perspective. The separation of law as enunciated and applied by those in
command from law as experienced by outsiders constructs a transnational
path that at a minimum should go back to the start of the "American
Century., 77 Indeed, Yamamoto ends his article with a brief excursion into
the event which perhaps best epitomizes the beginning of this cen-
tury... the ignoble annexation of Hawaii by the United States at the behest
of multinational corporate interests. After almost a century of struggle for
justice, the Hawaiian tragedy remains, as Yamamoto acknowledges,
"messy" and "never-finished."79 Yet the Hawaiian struggle for justice
provides an important reminder of the blurry lines between the domestic
and the international and of the necessity for transnational understanding.
73. Of course, one can also define human rights so narrowly as to deprive the
concept of any broad transformative potential. See G.J.H. van Hoof, The Legal Nature of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal of Some Traditional Views, in THE RIGHT TO
FOOD 97 (P. Alston & K. Tomasevski eds., 1984). This issue is also at the center of
debates over the current United Nations practice of focusing on elections in societies
coming out of brutal dictatorships. See Ibrahim J. Gassama, Safeguarding the Democratic
Entitlement: A Proposal for United Nations Involvement in National Politics, 30 CORNELL INT'L.
L.J. 287, 287-93 (1997).
74. See Paul Greenberg, King's Message, Values Endure, REG. GUARD, Jan. 18, 1999, at
13A.
75. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 844-52.
76. See id.
77. "The twentieth century is the American century. The British dominated the
nineteenth century, and the Chinese may cast a long shadow over the twenty-first, but
the twentieth century belongs to the United States because of the triumph of its faith in
the founding idea of political and economic freedom." EVANS, supra note 22, at xiv.
78. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 895-900; see also EVANS, supra
note 22, at 48-73 (providing a brief and benign description of early overseas American
imperialism).
79. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 831, 900.
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As the twentieth century draws to a close, we confront the full flow-
ering of American triumphalism. Not too long ago, many American
commentators argued freely that the economic crisis in Asia and other
parts of the world confirmed the singular superiority of the American
vision of capitalism.80 This is a persistent imperial vision, stated gently,
even apologetically this time, but still largely a reaffirmation of one that
can be traced directly to when American presidents like James Monroe,
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt held
the world stage.' The first comprehensive planning for a twentieth
century new world order under American leadership-the ultimate
expression of national exceptionalism-must be credited to the United
States' entry into the First World War.8 2 This early world orderist vision
stumbled initially in the face of strong currents of isolationism that mis-
perceived twentieth century internationalism as an abandonment of
national exceptionalism; 3 but the idea did not die. Indeed, even before
the United States entered the Second World War, liberal legalist planners
were hard at work, devising an even more comprehensive post-war
global, political, and economic order.84
Every one of the intergovernmental institutions engaged in manag-
ing global security and economic relations today originated from this
U.S.-centered effort. Both the United Nations system as well as the
Bretton Woods economic institutions-the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade-should be seen as deriving from early twentieth century Americas
efforts to reconceptualize the world to preserve its vision of human and
national relations. No other combination of national influences comes
close to matching those of the United States in the designing and nur-
80. See, e.g., Tim Smart, It was a Very_ Year; 1998: (a) Volatile, (b) Merger-rific, (c)
Cyber-spaced, (d) All of the Above, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1998, at H1.
81. See EVANS, supra note 22, at 50-67.
82. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 33-79 (1990)
(discussing the period from Woodrow Wilson's unsuccessful efforts to get the United
States into the League of Nations to Franklin Roosevelt's rekindling of internationalist
passions culminating in the United Nations).
83. See id. at 55-69. The continuing force of this isolationist tendency may be found
in the rhetoric of conservative gadfly Pat Buchanan: "I want to say to all the globalists up
there in Tokyo and New York and Paris, when I raise my hand to take the oath of office,
your new world order comes crashing down." Steven Stark, Right Wing Populist, ATLAN-
TIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1996, at 20C.
84. President Roosevelt was the critical force behind this renewed internationalism
which argued that unless the United States used its influence to create post war order, it
would inevitably be drawn into international conflicts. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 82, at
70-79; ROBERT C. HILDERBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS 5-9 (1990).
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turing of these structures."' The Cold War, third world nationalism, and
irredeemable pockets of American isolationism delayed, but clearly did
86
not derail, this enterprise.
Nelson Mandela, for example, has written about how he and other
anti-apartheid freedom fighters were inspired by the modernistic vision
emanating from the United States in the inter-war years. 87 Ironically,
those who provided the foundation on which the apartheid system was
constructed were also moved by this vision. Prominent among those
assisting the American conceptualizers of the post World War II order
was Jan Smuts, prime minister of the Union of South Africa.8 8 The irony.
of such connections between defenders of freedom and racists and the
apparent neutrality of law toward their condition did not escape Mandela
and other South Africans who experienced the profound racism of the
Smuts era. 89 Nor could it have escaped millions in the third world under
colonial rule, or for that matter, many in western countries who were
confronting "domestic" racial injustice. This was a period characterized
by great idealism with lofty rhetoric from western conceptualizers about
peace, freedom, human rights and justice, as well as hash pragmatism as
they defended their advantages. The aspirations and interests of millions
of subordinated non-White people in the United States, South Africa,
and the many European colonies throughout the world rarely penetrated
the rarified atmosphere and grand settings of what was at its core a he-
gemonistic project.
The transnational institutions that were created from this early
twentieth century process-largely from the minds of committed Ameri-
can internationalists and their westernized allies--supposedly elevated
85. Neither Japan nor Germany, the two most economically powerful nations today
after the United States, participated at Bretton Woods.
86. For example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was first conceived as the
International Trade Organization in the 1940s. Opposition centered in the United States
Senate derailed its establishment. The General Agreement on Tariffi and Trade (GATT)
was the compromise that lasted until 1995 when the GATT was merged into the WTO.
See Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GA TT: From the Havana Charter to the World
Trade Organization, 34 COLUMBIAJ. TRANSNAT'L L. 123 (1995).
87. See NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 83-84 (1994).
88. The Cambridge-educated Smuts was considered an Anglophile and very influen-
tial with the British. He participated in the creation of the League of Nations at Versailles
at the end of the First World War and successfully pushed for South Africa to enter the
Second World War as an ally of Britain. He served as prime minister of South Africa from
1939 until the Afrikaner National Party took over in 1948. See LEONARD THOMPSON, A
HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 157-86 (1990).
89. Of course the Smuts administration was not racist enough for many white South
Africans who voted to replace his administration in 1948 with an Afrikaner nationalist
regime advocating a comprehensive and more rigid racial discrimination and violence
program called apartheid. See id. at 187-220; MANDELA, supra note 87, at 96-97.
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rules, principles, and "the Rule of Law" over politics and power realities.
The new UN structure, for example, came with an International Court
of Justice whose statute duly codified the sources of international law.
Recall also the elaborate efforts to legalize the victors' treatment of the
vanquished in the Nuremberg trials.!° The Americans pushed the trials
over objections from people such as Stalin and Churchill who would
have rather lined up and executed the most objectionable of the defeated
leaders.91 However, United States' support for the "Rule of Law"-
universal standards promoted in the international military tribunals, the
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Genocide Convention, and the international human rights covenants, for
example, did not prosper under pressure from communism and third
world independence movements. As the United States' role in apartheid
South Africa and its rejection of the World Court in the Nicaraguan case
illustrated,92 the dissociation between justice as represented in the my-
thologies of these international institutions and justice as actually
experienced by invisible racialized masses all over the world is palpable.
93
Decolonization and third world revolutions brought other voices
with different ideas about justice and a post war order into these institu-
tions. The idealism of the original conceptualizers metamorphorsized
quickly into harsh pragmatism dedicated to preserving the status quo. The
United States and its allies have held steadfastly to advantages they have
built into the systems supporting the new world order and rejected
90. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946,
41 AM. J. INT'L. L. 172 (1947); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 562 (4th ed. 1990).
91. See BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 6 (2nd
ed. 1990).
92. In January, 1985, rather than face certain defeat at the World Court over the
government of Nicaragua's claim that the United States had violated international law by
engaging in illegal covert warfare against it, including sponsoring a rebel movement and
mining its harbors, the United States terminated its acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the World Court. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); see also Tom J. Farer &
Christopher C. Joyner, The United States and the Use of Force: Looking Back to See Ahead, 1
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 28-30 (1991) (discussing United States involve-
ment with Nicaragua rebels, later known as "contras"); MOYNIHAN, supra note 82, at 4-6,
120-48.
93. The general western support of or acquiescence in apartheid during the Cold
War era is another harsh illustration of this dissociation. See Gassama, Reaffirming Faith,
supra note 62, at 1526. Another prime example was the failure to support the elaborate
peace and security structure and processes outlined in the United Nations Charter. See
U.N. CHARTER, arts. 42-48. The actuality of a United Nations that could intervene
independent of major power support and supervision soon frosted earlier support for
standing UN forces.
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demands that would interfere with their power even when those demands
were cast in ternis of the principles they generally extolled in the abstract.
In the trade and economic development area, the United States has
long promoted a global trading and investment regime centered around
free trade and the free movement of capital. 94 At the same time, the
United States has profligately imposed restrictions and trade embargoes
that have hurt very poor as well as disfavored nations.9 United States
trade legislation is replete with conditions, restrictions, and exceptions
designed to advance a vision of world order that would be impossible to
explain to millions of desperately poor Africans, Asians, or Latin Ameri-
cans.96 Indeed, their attitudes would likely mirror those of many United
States citizens who increasingly are pawns in this project called globaliza-
tion. Few of these people, inside and outside the United States, are likely
to decipher an integral association between "justice" as they would
conceive it and "justice" as the new world orderists project it in their
press releases. 97 The disjuncture in the inter/national provides opportuni-
ties to deepen and expand liberal democratic ideology.98 Critical race
praxis suggests an important perspective for analyzing the role of tradi-
tional categories such as ethnicity and nationality in this radical
democratic project.
B. Disjuncture Between Race Theory and Political LauTyering Practice
The second theme outlined by Yamamoto is the disjuncture be-
tween progressive race theory and frontline political lawyering.
According to Yamamoto, while progressive race theorists and progressive
lawyers share the same passion and goals about ending racial injustice, a
growing gulf exists between theorists and practitioners. He charges the
two camps with operating in "separate realms: [theorists] in the realm of
94. See Demaret, supra note 86; JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT (1969).
95. For example, the United States has maintained and gradually expanded an
economic embargo against Cuba since the early sixties. See IBRAHiM J. GASSAMA, FORTY
YEARS OF HOSTILITY: INHUMANE CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S. ECONOMIC EMBARGO ON
CUBA (Report of the TransAfrica forum Cuba Delegation, Mar. 1999); Necessity of
Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States
Against Cuba, G.A. Res. 48/16, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 30, at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/48/16 (1993); Iglesias, Human Rights, supra note 5, at 371; Bourque, supra
note 62.
96. See Iglesias, Human Rights, supra note 5.
97. See Jonathon Peterson, Two Visions of Global Economy to Clash, REG. GUARD,
Nov. 29, 1999, at Al; Rebecca Cook, Up to 50,000 Protesters Ready for 'Battle in Seattle',
REG. GUARD, Nov. 29, 1999, at Al.
98. See LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 42, at 176.
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ideologies, discursive strategies, and social construction, [practitioners] in
the realm of civil rights statutes, restrictive doctrinal court rulings . . .,99
Yamamoto sees this growing divide as a consequence of both camps
reacting to the relentless neo-conservative assault characterizing post-civil
rights America. Theorists have responded to the backlash by becoming
more critical, attacking not only the neo-conservative position but also
the broader liberal agenda that underpinned the civil rights movement.1°°
On the other hand, progressive lawyers, according to Yamamoto, have
continued to labor within the "shrinking confines of the civil rights
paradigm,"10' becoming increasingly estranged from their more theoretical
allies. Yamamoto concludes this discussion by highlighting the work of
activist-scholars like himself who have demanded increased sensitivity to
102the need for a merger of theory and practice.
I think it would be illuminating to replay this insightful theme in the
transnational context both to illustrate the relationship in that milieu
between progressive activists (many but by no means all of whom are
lawyers) and theorists and, perhaps more importantly, to iterate the
fundamental insufficiency of analyzing justice struggles without due
appreciation of the transnational context. I shall do so by examining two
transnational campaigns that I have worked on: the Free South African
Movement of the 1980s and a more recent campaign against Chiquita, a
multinational company with headquarters in the United States that has
worked aggressively to eliminate European trade subsidies for the banana
export of several small Caribbean nations. These two cases amply illus-
trate, in the transnational context, the complex and often strained
relationship between progressive theory on the one hand and progressive
activism on the other. Yet they also echo Yamamoto's plea for rebuilding
connections in order to accomplish limited but important goals in the
service of justice.
1. South Africa : The Nature of Victory
The growth of the United States' Free South African Movement
(FSAM) in the 1980s was a direct response to two developments con-
cerning apartheid in South Africa: the Reagan administration's policy of
constructive engagement1 3 and growing social unrest inside South Af-
99. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 832.
100. See BELL, supra note 24, for an elaboration of this ongoing dialogue.
101. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 3, at 834.
102. See id. at 838-39.
103. See PAULINE BAKER, THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA: THE REAGAN
YEARS 22-53 (1989).
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rica.104 Constructive engagement tied the United States even more closely
to the White minority regime in South Africa and was part of an overall
U.S. foreign policy which gave the highest priority to combating the
perceived threats of communism. United States foreign policy in this
period complemented a domestic policy that increasingly marginalized
the interests of poor and minority communities within the United States.
Indeed, as the Reagan administration spent profligately to achieve mili-
tary superiority and to defeat communism in the third world, it also
severely cut domestic social spending that benefited the poor. Much of
the military and security spending went into sponsoring or sustaining
conflicts in third world countries, especially in already devastated parts of
Africa and Latin America. A new "Reagan doctrine" was deployed to
counter the "Brezhnev doctrine."' '° The results were as horrific as they
were absurd. Largely destitute people died in large numbers in a conflict
between doctrines and ideologies emanating from distant imperial centers.
The Free South African Movement that developed in the United
States in the mid 1980s, while only one of many historic efforts to affirm
the connections between domestic and foreign policies, was perhaps the
most successful. Its success, however, derived from its appeals to American
national exceptionalism-ideals or myths-to combat a neo-conservative,
or "Realist," dominance of the national foreign policy establishment.
Seizing upon television-fed images of brave South Africans fighting and
dying for freedom, human rights activists (theorists and lawyers) focused on
getting the United States government to legislate and enforce a broad set of
economic sanctions against the apartheid regime. '1 6
Much of the public discourse that fueled the movement in the
United States was conducted around a set of modernistic beliefs-an
uncritical global integrationist vision of a world bound together by the
supposed universality and indivisibility of a set of core human rights. A
considerable amount of progressive scholarly critique of this narrow and
fragile vision of law-based justice existed but it rarely disturbed the warm
and wholesome imagery that sustained this fundamentally liberal imperi-
alistic enterprise. The dominant "international" human rights perspective
paralleled the "domestic" civil rights establishment's fetishization of rights
in the struggle for justice. Unsurpisingly then, the compromise solution
that ended apartheid-much like the domestic compromise on civil
104. See Nicholas Haysom, The Total Strategy: The South African Security Forces and the
Suppression of Civil Liberties, in THE LAST YEARS OF APARTHEID: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN SOUTH
AFRICA (John Dugard et al. eds., 1992).
105. See generally Moynihan, supra note 82.
106. See Edward Walsh, Grass-Root Pleas Stir Lawmakers: GOP Conservatives Demanded
Reagan Shift on South Africa, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1985, at Al; Gassama, Reaffirming
Faith, supra note 62, at 1500-09.
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rights-offered democracy to the masses in the political or "public"
sphere while leaving the grossly unequal relationships in the economic or
"private" sphere virtually untouched. 10 7 This was not by accident; it was
an explicit quid pro quo. Rights rhetoric was lifted out of the socio-
political context of South African society and stripped of substantive
challenges to the condition of gross material inequity that characterized
the society. In effect democracy was confined largely to the election of
parliamentary representatives. To make this apartheid-ending comprormise
work, the image of Nelson Mandela as a kind, grandfatherly, irreproachable
and rather depoliticized figure-defender of an emasculated conception of
democracy characterized primarily by the demobilizing mantra of gradual-
ism-was constructed and then deployed to distract, hypnotize or satiate
mass demands for substantive social change.108 At least in the case of the
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., defenders of the status quo waited
until his death.
There was a particular moment in the course of my involvement in
FSAM when the easy promises of modernistic faith and the insights of
post-modernism came face to face. Shortly after the official release of
Nelson Mandela from prison, I was privileged to have a meeting with
him. I was accompanying one of the leaders of the anti-apartheid move-
ment-Randall Robinson of TransAfricaN--and we went to Johannesburg
to meet with Mandela to discuss his expected visit to the United States.
After a very pleasant meeting, we ran into Thabo Mbeki, Mandela's
successor as President of South Africa, then a senior official of the African
National Congress, at our hotel. After exchanging pleasantries, he in-
formed us that he was about to address a gathering of western business
leaders and selected others about his movement's plans for a post-
apartheid South Africa. Mr. Mbeki was well known to us as he had
visited our anti-apartheid offices often in the past to strategize about
ending U.S. government support of apartheid. We asked him if we could
attend the gathering with him, and he readily agreed until one of the
organizers who had been listening pulled him aside. He returned after a
brief conversation with the organizer to apologize and inform us that he
lacked the power to invite us to the conference. As we walked away, we
107. See Freeman, supra note 52.
108. See Richard Alm, Mandela Shows Caution in Approach to Rebuilding World View,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 13, 1994, at 1D; Patti Waldmeir, Mandela Pleases Business,
FIN. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at 4.
109. TransAfrica was created by African-American leaders in the 1970s to foster
greater Affican-American influence in the making and implementing of United States
foreign policy. As the most prominent American anti-apartheid organization in the 1980s,
it sponsored, among many other things, a daily protest outside the South African embassy
in Washington that later spread to many parts of the United States and lasted for more
than a year. See Gassama, Reaffirming Faith, supra note 62, at 1506-07.
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could see several people-representing American business and business-
funded organizations-who had for years opposed virtually every anti-
apartheid initiative, warmly greet Mbeki as they strolled into this meeting
on South Africa's future. It was a meeting to which anti-apartheid activ-
ists were not invited. 10
Perhaps the largely liberal, law-oriented anti-apartheid movement in
western nations (that I was a part of) could have benefited from greater
appreciation of the work of critical legal theorists. In retrospect, the
seductive power of the "Rule of Law" as the pragmatic possibility was
too great. Indeed, it appears that no one has discovered a more effective
way than rights rhetoric to successfully mobilize large numbers of people
to give their all to a struggle for justice. Theory that admits to no certain
outcome other than continued struggle lacks the punch of the traditional
mobilization for the attainment of a specific set of rights."' Yet, rights
discourse, orphaned from a critical perspective, sows the ground for a
harvest of despair. Liberal opportunists rush to sell out at the moment of
triumph, often in the name of pragmatism.
2. Caribbean Banana Trouble: Limits of Concern
Chicago columnist Clarence Page was one of those who could not
understand why Representative Maxine Waters, chairperson of the U.S.
House of Representative's Congressional Black Caucus, was getting
involved in a dispute ostensibly between the United States and the
European Union over trade preferences for banana producers in the
Caribbean."2 After all, African Americans have enough problems of their
own to be wasting precious time and resources dealing with "other"
people's problems.
The Page perspective, which is rather common, even if generally
unarticulated among many Americans, is rather odd given that African
Americans were some of the earliest victims of a peculiar turn at globali-
zation. The TransAtlantic slave trade was the most wretched by far of a
global enterprise that made human misery another commodity to be
110. See ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 184-86 (describing an account of this particular
incident as well as similar ones making the same point); see also $30 Million Donated to
Mandela Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1999, at A14 (testifying to the business embrace
of this once revised political leader and movement).
111. See also DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM ix (1992) (arguing that although "racism is an intregal, permanent, and
indestructable" part of society, the struggle against it is still justified).
112. See ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 120-121.
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exchanged for gold, cotton, sugar, molasses, spices, etc.' 3 The perspective
is also surprising today, given that, deprived of their only viable export
industry, people in these Caribbean islands-situated half-way between
the cocaine-producing countries in Latin America and the largest cocaine
consumer market in the world-could respond by selling their location
and services to international drug traffickers. 114 Additionally, there are the
historical bonds that significant numbers of Americans share with people
in these islands. American cities are teeming with recent immigrants and
children of not-so-recent-immigrants from these islands. Finally, what
about elementary notions of human solidarity in confronting global
injustice? Martin Luther King, Jr. once offered that perspective and
Malcolm X pushed it as he sought international support for black libera-
tion in the United States." 5
The banana campaign began in earnest when the U.S. complained
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the behest of the Cincin-
nati-based multinational company, Chiquita (formerly the United Fruit
Company). Chiquita's chairman, Carl Lindner, traditionally a Republican
benefactor, coincidentally had just donated more than $500,000 to the
Clinton campaign and the Democratic party a few months before the
1996 general elections.
These Caribbean islands are by and large one crop economies. Their
people live permanently on the verge of destitution. Chiquita, with its
vast plantations in Latin America, could at best gain only a tiny increase
in its share of the world trade in bananas if the WTO intervention proves
successful. Under the standards of the world trade regime that today is the
cynosure of globalization, however, the meager preferences these islands
receive from European nations are illegal. 116 The rules of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade do not focus on equality, social stability,
or socio-economic survivability as such.1 7 Free trade-trade without
113. See generally S.E. ANDERSON, THE BLACK HOLOCAUST FOR BEGINNERS (1995)
(examining the slave trade and its impact on African Americans); HUGH THOMAS, THE
SLAVE TRADE (1997) (documenting the history of the Atlantic Slave Trade from 1440 to
1870).
114. See Jeff Harrington, Chiquita's Slippery Trade Dispute, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Dec. 22, 1996, at I1; Brook Larmer, Brawl Over Bananas, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 28, 1997, at
43; Thomas W. Lippman, An Appeal for Banana Peace; General Suggests U.S. Trade Fight
May Undercut Caribbean Drug Battle, WASH. POST, June 6, 1996, at A27.
115. See An Appeal to African Heads of State, in MALCOLM X SPEAKS 72-87 (George
Breitman ed., 1966).
116. A WTO panel ruled against the European trade preferences. See Office of U.S.
Trade Representative, Press Release, 14TO Banana Report Confirms U.S. Win, May 22,
1997.
117. See Demaret, supra note 86; JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, INSTITUTION FOR INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT (1994); THE CASE AGAINST THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996). But see Paul
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barriers-is believed uncritically to lead to good things which may
include social stability. These are of course the same rules that encourage
the routine export of manufacturing jobs to cheaper locales in a seem-
ingly never-ending global race to the bottom.
The international campaign to preserve the socio-economic viability
of these small islands should be seen as an act of transnational solidarity.
The campaign was built upon an understanding of the chains, philosophi-
cal and pragmatic, historical and current, that tie oppressed communities
together even across national boundaries. The Slave trade that brought
most of the current inhabitants to these islands, as well as the longstanding
devastation caused by multinationals, were important considerations. So
also was the fact that Chiquita has only a tiny percentage of its workforce
employed in the United States; most work in Central American planta-
tions under conditions many consider substandard. Thus the banana
campaign was fundamentally about the alienation and devastation caused
to multiple communities across national boundaries by multinational
corporations lacking deep or lasting connections to any community or
nation. In this case the growing threat posed to all communities by
international drug smuggling gave added urgency to the campaign.
The banana campaign challenged ordinary people to seek diverse
ways to confront powerful transnational business alliances that are com-
prehensive in their reach and insatiable in their appetite.118 In this
particular instance, the interests of a multinational corporation, possessing
little or no abiding loyalty to any discernible community of people,
combined with the blunt power of the most powerful nation in the world
to threaten the very existence of many small but vital communities. The
alliance employed the rhetoric of the "Rule of Law" to mask the crude
and brutal operations of the new imperialism.
This new imperialism demonstrates no respect for boundaries-not
race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or even national sovereignty. Indeed,
today more than ever, as the barriers to transnational corporate combina-
tions are eroded, there is a pathetic sameness in the structures of
oppression that people all over the world confront. How soon before we
must all in our numerous tiny communities face one global bank, insurance
company, software monopoly, telecommunication provider, etc.? Under-
standing the scope and manner in which this new imperialism functions
Krugman, Enemies of the W/TO: Bogus Arguments Against the World Trade Organization (last
modified Nov. 23, 1999) <http://www.state.com/Dismal/99-11-23/Dismal.asp>.
118. See generally RICHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1994); THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 18 (challenging the perceived benefits of economic globalization);
WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD READY OR NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL
CAPITALISM (1977).
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could very well increase the despair of those who perhaps dream of
challenging it. It could provide, however, a powerful transboundary
vehicle for illuminating the disjuncture between law and order as con-
ceived by the international global elites and law-as-justice experienced by
ordinary people in their everyday lives all over the world." 9 Furthermore,
it could buttress the critique of the liberal faith in the fair operations of
traditional legal structures, thus saving successive generations from futile
investments in this regard. The end result could well be the identification
of possibilities for constructing lines of solidarity for the dispossessed of
the world not just across racial or ethnic lines but across all artificially
created boundaries.
CONCLUSION: THE SULTAN'S OBSESSION
I have often reflected on the obsession of Sultan Mehmet II (1451-
81) with the city of Constantinople. Assuming the Ottoman throne at the
age of 19, he was "determined from the outset to take Constantinople.,
2 0
He succeeded in 1453 after a two month long siege and immediately
proceeded to transform the heart of the Byzantine Empire into a symbol
of Islam's growing power. My interest in the Sultan's obsession, however,
relates to the impetus his triumph at Constantinople gave to those Euro-
pean adventurers seeking an alternate trade route around Africa to Asia.
When Christopher Columbus' persistence paid off in Queen Isabela's
backing, the "new world" was "discovered." Centuries of misery fol-
lowed for many in Africa and what later came to be known as the
Americas. I have often wondered what those who would be so tragically
affected were doing or were concerned about as the Sultan's obsession
grew. Were they so consumed by the press of their immediate needs and
conflicts that they could not see this looming, all-transformative threat?
Perhaps this is the fate of communities.
Today, however, what excuse do we have to remain ignorant or
chauvinistic in our concerns? Everyday we are confronted by the evi-
dence of the interconnectedness of our lives. Yamamoto's call for critical
race praxis was fundamentally a call to communities to look beyond their
immediate interests to try to envision the larger picture and to forge
alliances for the common global good. While this point can be made
119. See Edwina Gibb, New Seattle Clashes, Curfew Reimposed, REUTERS, Dec. 1, 1999.
120. READER'S DIGEST, WHEN WHERE & How IT HAPPENED 113 (1993). Sultan
Mehmet II was by no means the first Ottoman leader to seek control of Constantinople
or other European cities. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire and various European powers had
been engaged in centuries of conflict that would continue even after the fall of Constan-
tinople. See JOHN FREELY, ISTANBUL: THE IMPERIAL CITY 164-78 (1996) (discussing the
fall of Byzantium).
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about groups in conflict anywhere on this planet, it is especially important
to emphasize it in response to intergroup relations within the world's sole
superpower. It is not possible to resolve these apparently local disputes
without looking at the global structures of power and oppression. The
responses cannot succeed without going global. Critical race praxis makes
a strong demand on leaders in antisubordination struggles to bridge
artificial and destructive divides: between progressive race theory and
frontline political lawyering practice on the one hand, and between law
(as it conceives of justice) and racial justice (as it is experienced by racial-
ized groups). Whether the issue is the fate of affirmative action in
California at the close of the twentieth century, police brutality in the
inner cities, the treatment of women under the Taliban in Afghanistan, or
the role of the World Trade Organization in maintaining global inequal-
ity, the message to those struggling for progressive change is the same:
reach out to learn from others, to care and build solidarity across all
artificial boundaries.
